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Summary ;
This paper analyzes the incidence of the property tax in a
general equilibrium model under four different mobility assumptions
for economic agents. The model has workers, landowners, and entre-
preneurs who produce bread or housing, and two cities. An increase
in the property tax rate in one city usually benefits housing
producers at the expense of other agents in the economy.
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Mobility and General Equilibrium Incidence
of the Property Tax
by Jan K. Brueckner
I. Introduction
In Mieazkowski's well-known 1972 paper, modern tax incidence theory,
as enunciated by Harberger (1962), was first applied to analysis of the
incidence of the property tax. The paper's unconventional conclusions
have now become accepted doctrine, embodying what has been referred to
2
as the "new view" of the property tax. The main idea of the new
view is that an increase in the property tax rate in a community has two
effects: first, it depresses the rate of return on capital in the economy
as a whole; second, it increases the gross price of capital in the given
community relative to its price elsewhere.
The present paper reflects dissatisfaction with the previous analysis
on three grounds. First, the mobility assumption implicit in Mieskowski's
analysis is that capital, but not labor, is mobile among communities.
This is hardly an appropriate assumption for long-run analysis, in which
all economic agents must be freely mobile. Our paper remedies this
deficiency by analyzing the incidence of the property tax under various
mobility assumptions appropriate to the short, intermediate, and long run.
Our goal is to discover how the incidence of the tax depends on the mobility
of agents in a properly constructed model of the economy.
Our second criticism of Mieszkowski's analysis is really a criticism
of the underlying Harberger model. In that model, the stock of capital
in the economy is assumed to be fixed, which Harberger justified by

appealing to the empirical observation that aggregate saving is unresponsive
to the rate of interest. A true general equilibrium model must make the
capital stock endogenous, and we should be suspicious of theoretical results
vhich do not incorporate this endogeneity.
A related criticism of the Harberger framework concerns the migration
equilibrium condition, which states that rates of return on capital should
be equal in all communities. Our view is that the correct equilibrium
condition states that the utility level of the owners of capital , not the
rate of return on it, should be uniform throughout the economy. The
difference between these conditions is obvious when it is realized that
the prices of consianer goods will vary across communities due to differences
in property tax rates. Equal returns will not make owners of capital
indifferent to where they locate when the prices of the goods they consume
vary across communities.
In this paper, we analyze a stylized model of the economy \Aich does
not suffer from the above defects. Our principal innovation is the assump-
tion of a fixed number of entrepreneurs in the economy rather than a fixed
stock of capital. Each entrepreneur uses factors of production to produce an
output according to a given production function. The entrepreneur's endowment
is his entrepreneurial skill; other economic agents do not have the ability to
manage production. Since entrepreneurship takes the place of the capital input
in Harberger 's analysis, production in our model does not use intermediate goods
(capital). The other economic agents, workers and landowners, are endowed respec-
tively with identical labor skills, which are supplied Inelastically to producers.

and with land, which is also a factor of production. The analysis does
not require that we specify how much land each owner controls.
Our economy has two cities with equal fixed land areas, Ji. (they can
be thought of as islands). Two kinds of entrepreneurs exist: bread
producers and housing producers. Entrepreneurial skills are not trans-
ferable between production processes; Individuals endowed with the ability
to produce housing are incapable of producing bread, and vice versa. The
four types of economic agents all have the S£une utility function, which
depends on the consumption of bread and housing. We assume that labor and
land are the sole inputs into bread and housing production, respectively.
The use of one-factor production functions eliminates factor substitution
as a response to changes in property tax rates. While it would be easy
to write down equilibrium conditions for a model where both land and labor
an iapttt* to hwtag md bVMd vroAieelsB, walytis «f tmA a ao4«l vooK
be prohibitively difficult . We view our model as plausible and suggestive,
and feel that it represents a reasonable framework for analysis of tax inci-
dence in a general equilibrium setting.
It is also assumed that bread, which is numeraire, may be traded
between cities at zero cost, but that housing is a non-traded good. In
addition, it is assumed that workers and entrepreneurs are potentially
mobile at zero cost between cities, but that landowners may never move.
This is made plausible by the fact that the endowments of workers and entre-
preneurs are mobile, while the endowment of landowners is not. Migration
equilibrium will be characterized by equal utility levels in both cities
for those agents which are assumed to be mobile. This does not mean that

the profits of mobile entrepreneurs will be the same in both communities
(as in Harberger), because the price of housing will also be an argument
of the indirect utility function.
The strategy of the analysis will be to perform comparative static
calculations on the general equilibrium solution of the model under four
mobility assumptions; complete immobility (short run), producer immobility
(intermediate run), worker immobility (Mieszkowski's case), and full mobility
(long run). The tax rate change we impose is an increase in the property tax
rate in city 1 matched by a lump-sum rebate of the tax revenues to housing
producers, who we assume pay the tax. This change is equivalent to reducing
an existing head tax on housing producers while increasing property tax pay-
ments such that tax revenue is unchanged. Indeed, we can imagine that a
uniform head tax, levied on all the agents in the economy, is used to sup-
port public expenditures which are uniform across and within cities. The
property tax rate increase accompanied by the lump-sum rebate merely changes
the way in which the fixed amount of public expenditure is financed. Without
loss of generality, we set the level of the pre-existing head tax and the
level of public expenditure equal to zero to analyze the incidence question.
We assume no property tax is levied in city 2.
To facilitate analysis of the model, specific functional forms are
imposed. The production function for bread producers is f (L) = L
,
< a < 1, where L is labor input. The production function for housing
producers is h(ll) = X. , < 6 < 1, where £ is land input. The
utility function is Cobb-Douglas, which means (remembering that bread is
—6
numeraire) that the indirect utility function is proportional to Ip
where I is income, p is the housing price, and B is the exponent of

housing In the utility function divided by the sum of the exponents.
Demand functions for bread and housing are (1-6)1 and gl/p respectively.
In the appendix, analysis of models with a general utility function and
unspecified concave production functions is undertaken, but results are
incomplete.
In the next section, comparative-static analysis of the general
equilibrium solutions is performed. Subscripts on variables refer to the
cities, 1 or 2. Variables are wages, w ; bread profits, it .; labor
inputs, L
.
; land rents, r
.
; housing profits, t\„.; land inputs, £,
.
;
1 X ill X
housing prices, p.; property tax rates, t. (t2=0); housing entre-
preneurs, E„. ; and bread entrepreneurs, E .. In the analysis, we
ignore the requirement that the L
.
, E , , Ej,, be integer-valued.

II. Analysis
Equilibrium conditions which must hold with perfect competition under
all mobility assumptions are as follows for i=l, 2:
aL^"" = w^ (1)
TV^^ = (l-a)L^ (2)
p,(l-xpe£/-^ = r^ (3)
^Hi " (l-e(l-ri))PiJli® (4)
^i ^i' = f: ^\ih" " ^Pi^i'"') (5)
Condition (1) states that the labor inputs of bread producers are profit
-maximizing in both cities, and (2) gives the maximized value of profit.
Condition (3) says that the land inputs of housing producers are profit
-maximizing in both jurisdictions. Condition (4) incorporates the assumption
that the property tax revenue -is returned to housing producers in a lump-sum
6grant. The value of the lump-sum grant is T,p.£, = s, and profit is
p^(l-T.)(l-6) I. + s., which equals (4). Equation (5) states that the supply
of housing in each city equals the demand for it. Aggregate city income is
^i'^ci
"*"
^i^i^i "^ ^i^K' "^ ^i^' which, in view of (l)-(4) reduces to the
expression in parentheses in (5). Since bread is traded between cities,
total output must equal total demand in both cities, a condition which is

expressed in (6). Further conditions are needed to close the model,
but the form of these conditions depends on the particular mobility
assumptions. In the next four sections, we present the additional
conditions and the solutions for each mobility case.
A. Complete Immobility
When bread and housing entrepreneurs and workers are immobile,
equilibrium may involve unequal utility levels for a given agent in the
two cities. For simplicity, we assume equal division of the populations
of the agents between cities. The conditions which emerge from this
assumption are
h=h-^ (7a)
L, = L^ = f- , (8a)
c
where E„ and E are the total numbers of housing and bread entrepreneurs,
H c
respectively, in the economy, and N is total worker population. The land
input of a housing producer is equal to total land area, £, divided by
the number of producers, E^/2, yielding (7a). The labor input of a
bread producer is the size of the labor force, N/2, divided by the number
of producers, E /2, yielding (8a). The system (l)-(6), (7a), (8a) has
fifteen equations, while the unknowns L., I., w,, v., p., ir ., tt„,^
x' 1 x' i' "^i* ex' Hx
are fourteen in number. A general equilibrium system where no numeraire
has been specified has one redundant equation by Walras* lavr, which means
that the level of prices is indeterminate. Specifying the numeraire
eliminates one unknown, but the redundancy of the extra equation means
the system is not overdetermined. In our system, a solution which

satisfies any fourteen equations necessarily satisfies the fifteenth.
Recall that we assume t„=0 (no property tax is levied in city 2)
and analyze the effect of increases in t, «
Analysis of the complete immobility case is particularly simple.
Solutions for i. and L. are given directly by (7a) and (8a), w.
and Tt . are given by (1) and (2), and the p. are given by (5).
None of these solutions depends on t., and since populations are
symmetrical, the solutions for each of these variables are the same in
both cities. From (3) and (4), r„ and tt „ do not depend on t^. But
(3) and (A) also show that Sr^/BT, < and 9tt„, /St^ > 0. Land rent
X X nX X
decreases and housing profits increase in city 1 when t^ is increased.
Since utility levels of the agents depend only on income and the housing
price, we see immediately that in city 1, the landowners* utility level
falls and the housing producers' utility level rises when the property
tax rate increases, while other agents are unaffected. The same result
holds in the general case (see appendix).
In this example, city 2 is insulated from the effect of the tax
change because all agents are immobile. Ttie city 1, bread producers*
profits and wages are independent of t because the fixed work force
and fixed number of bread producers yield labor input per firm which is
independent of T-. Since land use by housing producers is also
determined directly by the fixed number of producers, aggregate income
in (5), and hence the price of housing, is independent of x^. Thus,
the effects of a change in x are felt only through the solutions
for ir„^ and r^^ in (3) and (4).

B. Producers Immobile
While complete immobility is a short-run assumption, our view is
that the appropriate intermediate-run assumption makes producers immobile
while allowing workers to move. In reality, it appears that individuals
change locations more easily than firms, which means that in the intermediate
run, it is appropriate to treat producers as immobile.
Since housing producers are immobile, the solution for H, and £„ is
the same as in the previous case:
Jl, = £. = 1^ . (7b)
1 ^ Eg
However, the labor force of each city is now endogenous, so the full
-employment condition becomes
^ (L3_ + L2) = N , (8b)
which states that when we add the numbers of workers in each city, which
equal E L./2 since bread entrepreneurs are divided equally, the sum equals
total worker population. Since workers are mobile, their utility levels
must be the same in both cities in equilibrium. From the Cobb-Douglas
indirect utility function, this requires
— ft — R
^1^1 " ^2^2 • ^^^^
As in the previous case, this model has fifteen equations and fourteen
unknowns, and as before, the solution is relatively simple. Equation (7b)
gives H and 2.^, and using (1) and (5) in conjunction with this solution
gives

Pi 2
h (2,)' 1 - g . \ L? _ ^c
2 ^
==
2
10
rw.^a/a-1
^^Q^j
which implies that p. is proportional to w. . Using (9b), this fact
implies that w-=w„, which means L^=L». From (8b) we get L =L„=N/E , which
gives w
.
, and the (equal) it and p. are given by (2) and (10b). In city 2,
(3) and (4) give r„ and n ,.. None of the above solution values depends on
T, . However, we see from (3) and (4) that dt^/Zt:^<0 and Sir -/9t->0, and
J. X X HX X
since p. does not change, the utility levels of landowners and housing
producers in city 1 fall and rise respectively; the outcome is exactly the
same as in the complete immobility case. In fact, the worker mobility assump-
tion does not lead to any migration in this model. The equal-wage result
yields equal labor inputs by bread producers, which, since producers are
evenly divided, implies equal division of the work force regardless of the
level of T, . Thus city 2 is insulated from the effect of changes in t^
,
and since aggregate income in city 1 is independent of x,, the price of
housing is independent of t.. and effects of a change in the tax rate are
felt only through (3) and (4). Similar results hold in the general case,
as shown in the appendix.
C. Workers Immobile
In our view, a model with mobile producers and immobile workers does
not realistically represent differential mobility over any time horizon.
We analyze this model, however, because it was analyzed by Mieszkowski and
implicitly underlies the "new view" of the property tax. Our results
surprisingly contradict Mieszkowski ' s conclusion that the level of the price
of housing in a city is positively related to its property tax rate.

^1
=
-'^\l
h--'l\2
h-= N/2E^3^
h-= N/2E^2
\l + \2 = ^c
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The distribution of entrepreneurs is endogenous under our assumptions,
and the additional equilibrium conditions are
(7c)
(8c)
(9c)
(10c)
(lie)
\^^\2-\ (12c)
"hi Pl"^ = \2 Pz"^ (1^^>
Note that (9c) and (10c) reflect the assumption that the size of the (im-
mobile) labor force in each city is N/2, Equations (13c) and (14c) constrain
the utility levels of bread and housing producers in the two cities to be
equal. Our system now has nineteen equations, and the number of unknowns
has increased to eighteen with the addition of the Ej,. and E .. Solution of
model is considerably more complicated than in the previous cases.
Equations (5) , (9c) , and (10c) yield
-^^'
- \A-^^ - ^a./-'/2, (15c)
and (13c) and (14c) in conjunction with (2) and (4) give
1 Pi " 2 P2 ^ ^^
(i-e(i-T^))ji^® p^^"^ = a-Q)i^^ v^'^ . (17c)
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Expressing p in terms of Si. and L, from (15c), (16c) and (17c) become
(L2/L^)^ (i^2^^1^*' " ^ ^^^^^
(L2/L^)^"-^ {i^/i^)^'^^ = z (19c)
where
e = a + 6(1 - a)
b = (9 - 1)6
1 - 9(1 - T )
2 = 1 - e
' <20c)
Using (7c) - (10c), (18c) and (19c) become
^e /„ \b
c
'E_ \'l%^
\Z-- '] \\2- '' "
\
e-1 / \b+l
\2 ] te
TT- - 1 h^ - 1! = z (22c)
Solving for E „ gives
^c2
=
E
c
1 + z
\l-
E
c
, .
-A
and
1 +
follows from (lie) , where
(23c)
(24c)
^ = bta = aa'-'e) -f 66 > <25c)
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From (23c), (24c), (9c), and (10c), we have
L, ^^\* '"^ (26c)
c
c
Solving (21c) and (22c) for E^^ yields
and
^2 = tA- <28c)
1 + z
1 + z
follows from (12c) , where
e
= g + e(i ~ g) >
» = "bTT- = a(l - e) ^ 86 > 0- ^30c)
We also find
From (15c), (3), (26c), and (27c), we have
a-1
T^ = k(l + z"^) (33c)
r^ = k(l - T^)(l + z '')
,
(34c)
where k = eB(N/2)°' E ~"/(l-3)£. Also, substituting the solutions for
X,. and L. into (15c) yields
P2 = m(l + z"") (1 + zn (35c)
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p^ = m(l + 2 ) (1 + z ") , (36c)
where m = (k/e) (£/E^)-'-~®. Using (4), (31c), (32c), (35c), and (36c), we have
A
""^
B
Trjj2 = q(l - 9)(1 + z ) (1 + z ) (37c)
-A
°"^
-B
TTg^, = q(l - 9(1 - tp)(l + z "") (1 + 2 '') (38c)
where q = (k/6)(£/Eg),
Now 8z/8t, = 6/(1 - 0) > 0, and given A, B > 0, the above results
immediately imply
9E
,
9E „
^1
> 0, -~£i <
3t^ ^"^1
8L 8L„
^ < 0, ^ > (39c)
8
^1 . '\
> 0, -rr— <8T^ ' ^\
^ < 0, -— > 0.
8t^ ' 3x^
From (1) and (2), variations in the L. from (39c) imply
3w^ 9w„
^ > 0, -^ < (40c)
Since a - 1 < 0, we have dv^/Zx^ < 0. It may be shown that 3r^/9T- <
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as long as
(1 - a)(i - T ) ee
- z < . (41c)
eg + a(l - 6)
This inequality holds because z > 1 and the first expression is less than
unity. Hence 3r./3T, < 0. It may be shown that 9p^/8T, has the sign of
-A~B-1 a(l - 6) ,, ..„ -B-1 L .6(1 - a) , ,,„ .
Since z > 1 and its coefficient in the last term of (42c) is less than unity,
the last term in parentheses, and hence the entire expression, is ambiguous
in sign. However as t^ approaches zero, z approaches unity and (42c) becomes
negative; for "small" values of t.., 3p^/3T^ < 0. It raay be shown that Sp„/8T-
has the sign of
,A4-B-1 cd - 6) ^ _
^
^^B-l L
_
e(l-a) 1 \
a(l - e) + 8B g(l - a) + a ^
Since 1/z and its coefficient in (43c) are both less than unity, the term in
parentheses in (43c), and hence the entire expression, is positive. Thus
ap^/Sx^ > 0. Similar arguments establish 8ir
-/^t-i > 0. Unfortunately,
the sign of 37r -/9t., is ambiguous.
A noteworthy feature of our results is that they contradict Mieszkowski's
well-known conclusions. When the property tax rate is increased from a low
level in city 1, the price of housing in city 1 declines while the housing
price in city 2 increases. I-Iieszkowski believed that cities with above-average
property tax rates would have above-average housing prices. Both housing
and bread entrepreneurs migrate from city 2 to city 1 in response to the
change in t^. Land rents fall in both cities, while the wage increases
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in city 1 and decreases in city 2. The profits of bread producers fall
in city 1 and rise in city 2, while the profits of housing producers
Increase in city 2.
The utility level of workers rises in city 1 because the wage rises
and the price of housing falls, while the fall in the wage and the increase
in the housing price in city 2 means the utility level of workers there
falls. Since land rent falls in city 2 and the price of housing increases,
the utility level of city 2 landowners falls. Determining utility changes
for other agents requires additional computation. Calculations show that
the T^ - derivative of the indirect utility function of bread producers
in city 1 (see 13c) with substitution of the solutions for it
^
and p^
has the same sign as 1 - z, which is non-positive since z
_> !• Thus the
utility level of bread producers in city 1 falls, and since bread producers'
utility is always equal in both cities, their utility level in city 2 also
falls. Similar calculations show that the utility level of housing
producers increases in city 2 when t, is "small", which also implies
an increase in city 1. In addition, for t^ "small", it may be shown
that the utility level of city 1 landovmers falls when t^ increases.
All the results for this model are summarized in Table 1, Unfortunately,
analysis of the model in the general case is intractable, as discussion in
the appendix shows.
D. Complete Mobility
The appropriate long-run assumption is that all agents aside from
landowners are mobile. The additional equilibrium conditions under this
assumption are
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i^ = £/Ejj^ (7d)
2
it/Ejj2 (8d)
\l -^ \2 = ^c ^^^-^^
^l-'hl-h (lid)
^l^l" "^ ^2^2" ^^'^'^^
Vl^i"^ = "c2P2"^ ^^3^>
^HlPl"^ = ^H2P2""^ • ^^"^^^
While most of these conditions are familiar, (9d) is the nev? worker full
employment condition.
The solution is simpler in this model than in the previous case.
Dividing (13d) by (12d) yields
^^c'^^l
^
"^'iJ^l '
^"^^^^ -'^°^ ^^5 ^^^ *^2)
yields L- = L„ , w^ = w„ , and ir . = tt „ . From (9d) we have L^ = L« =N/E
,
which also gives the w, and ir .. None of these solutions depends on t,, so
* X ci '^ 1'
we have immediately
3w, 9w- 8L, 3L- Sir , Stt „
1
_
2 1
_
2
_
cl
_
c2
_ nSHi
8t ~ 3t "" 3t ~ 9t " 3t ~ ^i^i " " • ^^
''
Wages, bread producer profits and labor input per firm are unresponsive to
changes in Tj in both cities. Now (lid), (7d), and (8d) yield
^1 "^ ^2 " ^1^2^'^^ ' ^-^^^^
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and (14d) and (4) yield, in view of p, " Po*
^1
=
/ 1-6 \^^^
' £o = at^, (17d)
I
1 - 6(1 - T^) j "2 - "'2"
Together (i6d) and (17d) give
.
ia + m
^8d)
and
\
\i = rrr ^^^-^^
a
^H2 = rrr ^^id)
follow from (7d) and (8d). Using (18d) and (19d) and the solution for
L, and L„, (6) yields
1-e ,, , 1-e^-l
p = y (a + 1)-""^ (1 + a^""^)'-^ (22d)
where y = ^\^"^ N°/(l - S))l® \"~^ ' ^^^^^ ^^^ '^^^h (19d) and (22d) yield
""hi
"
''H2
= '=<^° + i>^^^ ^ ^>'"'^» ^23d)
where t = 6(1 - 6) E^-^"" n'^/(1 - g) E^. Similarly,
r^ = n(l - t^)(1 + a^~^)~-^ (24d)
r^ = n(l + a®"-'-)"^, (25d)
where n = gSE "'•"" N^^/d - e)fc. Finally, (5) yields
^cl " ^c^^
"^ a^"®)"^ (2&d)
E
c2
= E^(l + a^"-'-)"-^. C27d)
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Since 9a/ 3t^ = -a.1 {l - 9(1 - t^^)) < 0, the following results are immediate;
3t,
<
>
8£.
9t,
>
< (28d)
3E
cl
9t,
>
3E
c2
9t,
<
ar.
17,
< 0.
Computation shows that
3r, -r.
3t, (i + a^"®)(l - tp
9Tl
-=£_
1 +
^1^
1-0
1 - 6(1 - T^)
(a + 1)^"^ (1 + a^"®)
f ^ 1x6-2 - aa
<
> 0,
(29d)
(30d)
where p refers to the common housing price. Since ir... = ir.,- = p(l - e)il„
and both p and £,„ increase with x^ , we have
air
17,
> 0, (31d)
where ir refers to the common housing profit level,
n
When T^ increases, both types of entrepreneurs migrate to city 1, the
price of housing rises in both cities, land rents fall in both cities,
and housing producers' profits rise in both cities. However, wages and
bread producers' profits do not change.
The utility levels of workers, bread producers, and landowners fall in
both cities because the wage, profit, and rent levels either fall or remain
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unchanged while the housing price rises in both cities. The utility level
— fi 6 1 -~fi
of housing producers is ir p = (1 - 6)£„ p , which increases with t^
because both il_ and p increase. The results of this model are summarized
in Table 1.
Requiring equal utility levels across cities for both bread producers
and workers yields equal wages, implying equal labor inputs by bread pro-
ducers, which (9d) shows to be independent of t^. This establishes that
wages and bread producer profits are independent of x^ in both cities; part
of the economy is insulated from the effect of changes in x^ by the simul-
taneous satisfaction of the worker and bread producer equal-utility conditions.
The appendix shows that this result always follows with a general utility
function and a concave bread production function. Other results from this
section also hold in the general case, as is shown in the appendix.
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III« Conclusions
Examination of Table 1 suggests several broad conclusions. Regardless
of mobility assumptions, housing producers are never hurt by and usually
benefit from an increase in city I's property tax rate. Landowners and
bread producers never benefit from the tax rate increase, and are usually
made worse off by it. Workers in city 2 never benefit from the increase,
while workers in city 1 benefit only under the assumption of worker
immobility. Roughly speaking, an increase in the property tax rate in
city 1 benefits housing producers at the expense of other agents in the
economy regardless of the mobility assumption.
A striking change in the incidence of the tax occurs between the
first two and last two lines of Table 1. The difference between these
sets of cases is, of course, the mobility assumption for producers.
Producer immobility means that incidence is localized, with effects felt
only by housing producers and landowners in city 1, but when producers
are mobile, all agents in the economy are affected by a change in the
property tax rate. It is interesting to note that for a given assumption
on producer mobility, changing the worker mobility assumption has little
effect on the qualitative incidence results. When producers are immobile,
no change in incidence follows from allowing consumers to move. When
producers are mobile, allowing worker mobility only changes the direction
of the effect on workers in city 1, The utility increase under worker
immobility turns into a decrease under mobility as workers migrate from
city 2 to city 1 to take advantage of better opportunities there. What
these observations indicate is that in terms of qualitative incidence
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resultH, Mleazkowski's cane Is a good approximation to the long run,
full mobility cuse.
It is never possible to give a causal interpretation of comparative
static results in a fully simultaneous equation system because everything
depends on everything else. Thus it is not possible to say "why" our
model generates many of the results we have derived. It is clear, however,
that the model's unconventional structure in responsible for results which
seem at variance with the new view of the property tax. But precisely
because this structure provides a more realistic representation of the
economy than the darberger framework, we feel thai, our incidence results
must be taken more seriously than the new view results. Of course, there
is considerable room for improvement on our analysis. Future work could be
directed toward adding detail and more realism to the model. The general
framework, however, appears to be an appropriate one for the analysis of
property tax Incidence.
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Appendix
This appendix presents analysis using general concave bread and housing
production functions, f(L) and h(i,), and a general indirect utility function
V(p, I). The general conditions analogous to (i) - (6) are
f'(L^) = w^ (1')
Tr^^=fa,)-f'(L.)L^ (2')
p^(l - T^ h'(£^) = r^ (3')
"^Hi " Pi<"^^i> - ^^ - ^±> h'^V^i^ *^^'^
V'^V " °H^Pi' \i^^V "^ <^Pih(£^)/Jl^) (5')
E^^f(L^) + \2^ih^) = D^(p^, E^^f(L^) + £p^h(il^)/£^)
where Dj, and D are aggregate demand functions for housing and bread re-
spectively. The price of housing appears in the bread demand function with
a general utility function. The second argument of the demand functions
is aggregate income, which is calculated using (!') - (4*), Condition
(4') incorporates the lump sum rebate s, = p.T,h()l.). We now consider the
different mobility cases.
A. Complete Immobility
The additional conditions for this case are (7a) and (8a) as before.
Solutions for the Z. and L. are given directly by (7a) and (8a) and the
(equal) p. are then given by (5*). Profits are given by (2') and (4')

24
and land rent by (3')» As before the only solutions which depend on t^
are r^ and tt ., and Sr^/at < O5
^^'hi'^^1 ^ ^*
B. Producers Immobile
Additional conditions for this case are (7b)
,
(8b). and
V(w^, p^) = VCw^, P2). (9b')
If we substitute w = f*(L.) in (9b') and substitute the solution for
the £. into (5'), then the four-equation system composed of (5'), (9b'),
and (8b) solves for the four unknowns L. and p., and the solutions do not
depend ou t^. Thus, as before, the only variables which depend on x, are
ri and fr„, , and we have 3r-,/3TT < 0, 8Tr„,/8t, > 0.
C. Consumers Immobile
Additional conditions are (7c) - (12c) and
V(Tr^^, p^^) = V(Tr^2' ^2^' ^^^'''^
Substituting it and
^u^ in (13c') and (lAc') from (2') and (4'),
eliminating E
. and EL. in (5') using (7c) - (10c), and using (7c) - (12c)
to derive E L,L_ = N(L^ + L„) and E,,£,£„ = £(£. + £„) results in aCl2 1 2 lilz 1 Z
six-equation system in the six unknowns p., i., and L,, Since t appears
in this system, all the solutions depend on it, and performing comparative
status requires totally differentiating the system. We assumed this computa-
tion would be intractable and did not attempt it.
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D. Full Mobility
Additional conditions in this case are (7d) - (lid) and
V(w^, p^) = VCw^, P2) (12d')
We may show w. = w-
, p^ = p_ as follows: Suppose p^ ^ Po' Then
w, > w„ and it , > tt „ are necessary from (12d') and (13d'). But w^ > w.
1 2 cl cz -L I
implies L^ < L„ given the concavity of f. However, since dfr ./dL. =
-f"(L,)L, > 0, L^ < L- implies it , < ff -, • Hence w^ > w. and it . > ir arei i ' 1 2 cl c2 12 cl c2
incompatible. Assuming p- < p_ also leads to a contradiction, and hence
p^ = p„ is necessary. This implies w = w and L^ ~ ^0* ^^'^ using (9d)
we get L, = L- = N/E . This solution deteirmines the (equal) w. and ir .
,
12c 1 cl
and it is clear that none of the above solution values depends on t .
Since p = p , (14d) requires tt^^ = ir^^, or
hOl^) - (1 - T^)h'(£^)i.j^ - h(£2) + h'(Jl2)^2 " ° ^-^^^'^
From (7d), (8d), and (lid), we get
£^ + ^2 - ^1^2^'''^ ^ ^ (16d')
These equations yield
3£
j^ = h'(Jl^))c^ ^^iV^ " '-'*^^ " ° U7d')
8£
-3:^ = h' (9,^)1^ (1 - J-2Ep/l)/D > (18d»)
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where D = T^(h'(£^) - (1 - T^)h"(£^)£^) (1 - S.^E^/1) - h"a^)!i^il - l^E^/l)
< and £.E^/£ = E^/Eu-j ^ !• Equations (17d) and (18d) imply
^ > ^ < (19d')
in view of (7d) and (8d).
Since p^ ~ Po' ^^^ "^^ ^^ written
where p is the common value of the p^. . Since (3D /3p)/(9D /8I) > 0, it
turns out that 3p/9T, has the sign of
Using (17d') and (18d') we find that {diJdx )/lJ^ = -(35, /3t^)/£^ and
hence that (21d') has the sign of
/ \ 3£,
- h'(£^)£^ - h(£^) + h(£^) - (1 - T^) h'(£p£^|^
\ «,
"
/
'
where (15d') has been used. Hence 3p./3T^ > 0. From (4'), tTu- ~ v(.^(^2^
- h* (i„)!Ly) f and the expression in parentheses is Increasing in t^ by
the concavity of h and by (18d'). Since 9p/3T^ > 0, this means 3Tr,,„/3T, > 0,
and 3iT . /3t^ > follows also. Analyzing changes in the r. is complicated,
nX X i
but it may be shown that 3r /3t- < while 3r„/3T^ is ambiguous in signo
In addition, 3E ./3t^ cannot be signed unambiguously.
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All we can say about utility changes in the general model is that,
workers, bread producers, and city 1 landowners suffer a utility decrease
because their incomes fall or remain unchanged while the price of housing
increases. Since housing profits increase, the utility change of housing
producers is ambiguous, and since the change in r„ is uncertain, the utility
change for city 2 landowners is also uncertain.
The similarity of the results in the general full mobility case to
those derived using specific functional forms leads us to believe there
is nothing pathological about the special solution presented in the text.
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Footnotes
I am indebted to Ron Harstad for invaluable assistance in developing
the basic structure of the model analyzed in this paper.
2
For other papers in this tradition see McClure (1970), (1977),
Courant (1978), See also Mieszkowski (1969). McClure (1970) addresses
the issue of mobility, but his model only has one good and suffers from
the defects discussed below.
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